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Livestock, agriculture, and horticulture products are essential in 
the New Zealand economic sustainable development. 
Consequently performance and governance of active companies in 
these areas of business are constantly monitored by the public 
through legislators, stock market, government agencies, and 
media. Practically corporate governance disclosures are providing 
essential information for such monitoring and analysis. This 
paper intention includes critically evaluate corporate governance 
disclosures of agriculture companies. Implementation of the 
content analysis methodology enables this research project to 
present analysis of the level of compliance with the 2004 
Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines that put 
forwarded by the New Zealand Stock Exchange (governance 
related disclosure and their non-listed counterpart as expected 
providing even less disclosure in this area. The financial and 
governance reports of these companies are suffering from 
deficient transparency in the area of corporate governance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
New Zealand economy is an agricultural based 
economy that more than 95% of the companies are 
SMEs while big agricultural companies are leading 
the industry. According to Statistic New Zealand in 
February 2014 about 70,000 companies were active 
in agriculture, forestry and finishing shaping the 
second largest group of companies after retail, 
hiring and real estate services (Statistics New 
Zealand factsheet, 2014). Nonetheless, small and big 
agriculture companies are active in exporting 
agricultural product while big companies are act as 
role models for SMEs and are in many cases are the 
sole buyer of SMEs’ products. Consequently the 
prospect of big companies (listed, non-listed, or 
government owned) have direct impact on SMEs and 
the New Zealand economy. Apparently the financial 
reports and therefore financial analysis are 
providing an insight into company’s effectiveness 
and efficiency, in the same way non-financial 
information about corporate governance (CG) 
offering a complete picture of how companies 
equipped to maintain and implement developmental 
plans for further effectiveness and efficiency in the 
sustainable development of the company and 
consequently the whole economy of the country.  
In the small common law New Zealand jurisdiction, 
CG is important since the country is involve in free-
trade agreement with Australia in one hand and with 
the United States in the other hand while Australia 
has the same agreement with the USA. This 
condition implies that New Zealand companies CG 
compliance and disclosures are closely scrutiny by 
foreign investors and potential export competitors 
which agricultural companies are the main players.  
This research project is developed to put some 
shade on how big agricultural companies in New 
Zealand are considering corporate governance rules. 
The study first looks at the state of CG in the 
agricultural sector of the New Zealand from 
institutional perspective then at the micro level 
considers the implementation CG rules in the listed 
and non-listed agricultural big companies.  For listed 
companies unlike non-listed companies providing 
CG disclosure is one of the listing prerequisites. To 
be comprehensive provide a comparative analysis 
big non-listed companies that prepare and published 
financial statements are also considered in the 
study.  
Following the introduction, a background of the 
study including the research questions is presented 
in the section two and methodology in the section 
three of the paper. Section four is results 
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presentation and discussion while the last section 
concluded the research project and providing 
recommendations.  
 
1.2. Background of the Study 
 
Corporate governance literature is well documented 
in the literature; however the literature of CG in New 
Zealand is limited to some research studies in the 
recent years. When it comes to CG in agriculture 
companies, no research study is founded suggesting 
the need of fundamental research studies in this 
area. Considering the importance of sustainable 
development in agricultural products which is vital 
to New Zealand economic development via sustain 
exporting agricultural products, CG in the 
companies active in this area is vital. Agricultural 
product while vulnerable to climate changes and 
international competition are vigorous for human 
beings life. Agriculture companies must adopt an 
ingenious CG system to win the indigenous and 
international competition while encountering 
climate changes yet be able to grantee their 
sustainable development. In the following section a 
literature of CG New Zealand is explained as a 
starting point of developing research questions of 
the study.   
 
1.2. Corporate Governance in NZ 
 
In the literature of CG typically listed companies are 
subject of data collection and in fewer cases non-
listed big companies are considered relevant for 
data collection. In the New Zealand context while a 
majority of registered companies (about 95%) are 
SMEs, a limited number of big companies is listed in 
New Zealand Stock Limited (NZX) main board (NZSX), 
Alternative Market (NZAX), or the Debt Market 
(NZDX). Those companies that are not listed are a 
vast spectrum of micro companies (family owned, 
less than 5 employee), to SMEs (less than 100 
employee) and some big state owned companies. The 
financial market required listed companies to adopt 
CG rules on the basis of compile or explain regime. 
As it is explained in the Legitimacy and Stakeholder 
theories, it is assumed that many SMEs and big non-
listed companies will follow the stock market CG 
guidelines on the voluntary basis to be legitimate 
and provide appropriate financial and non-financial 
information to win the information conflict of the 
stakeholder.  
Nonetheless based on the agency theory, CG 
disclosure receives more attention where ownership 
and managerial control are separated. Looking at the 
New Zealand companies’ ownership structure, 
reveals that owners managers are common practice 
with an increasing level of majority shareholders 
controlled in non-listed companies. This group of 
companies that includes securities issuer companies 
are not bond to implement CG rules and regulations, 
but may adopt CG rules voluntary.  
CG studies appear in the literature considering 
the unique socio-economic environment of New 
Zealand. Fox, Walker and Pekmezovic (2013) that 
have presented a literature review of CG disclosure 
papers confirming that implementation of CG is 
good in the listed companies while non-listed 
counterparts (i.e. debt securities issuers) are not in 
the same position. While it is documented that in 
2010 New Zealand is ranked as the fifth in the world 
for corporate governance according to GMI ranking 
(GMI, 2010), Fox, Walker and Pekmezovic (2013) 
believe that “comply or explain” installed by NZX in 
complying with CG rules strength the status of CG in 
New Zealand. They believe that this condition may 
not be occur by strict regulatory regime and the 
“comply or explain” approach have developed 
entrepreneurial boards that contribute in mitigating 
managerial risk from CG perspective.  
It is concluded by Van der Walt, Ingley, and 
Townsend (2006) that New Zealand companies’ 
boards are more homogenous. Homogenously is in 
gender, age, ethnicity, and functional may link to the 
board configuration, strategic context and corporate 
decision quality. In the same area Ahmed, Hossain 
and Adams (2006) consider the effect of board 
composition and size on the information usefulness 
of financial reports. They concluded that 
information usefulness is negatively related to the 
aforementioned variables even when the board 
include outside directors.  
The effect of CG mechanisms on finance 
policies in the listed companies reveals that 
companies with weak CG mechanisms have a 
tendency to rely more on financial leverages than 
their counterpart with strong mechanisms in CG 
(Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 2012b). Nevertheless, a 
weak CG rules implementation is considered as the 
cause of finance company failures in New Zealand 
(Wilson, Rose, and Pinfold, 2010).  
Fox, Walker and Pekmezovic (2013) provide a 
decent discussion on the impact of factors such as 
type of control and insider ownership which is the 
proportion of ordinary shares held by board of 
directors. As they illustrated, listed companies in 
New Zealand historically were less controlled by 
majority of shareholders than managers while an 
increase in the international ownership is observable 
from 1985 to 2001 (Fax & Hamilton, 1994 and Fax & 
Walker, 2002). As Fox and Hamilton (1994) indicate, 
they did not find a statistical relationship between 
ownership diversification and structural control, 
furthermore companies’ profitability are not related 
to managerial or ownership control as explained by 
Fox et al. (2013). In this area Watson and Hirsch 
(2010) studied the relationship of different type of 
control from CG perspective with corruption. They 
concluded that weak CG implementation coupled 
with unjustifiable corporate structure is considered 
as a source of corporate corruption. In the same 
area, research results of Hossain, Prevost and Rao 
(2001) showed that in New Zealand at the 
commencement of the 21 century the insider and 
shareholder ownership were 6.8% and 76.3% 
respectively. They documented a strong relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance 
and concentrated ownership that has an adverse 
impact on the firm performance. However, a 
contradict results is reported by Reddy, Locke, and 
Scrimgeour in 2010. Study of Jiang and Habib (2009) 
concluded that corporate disclosure differently 
impacted by various shareholding control. It seems 
two decades before the effect of different type of 
ownership on firm performance and consequently 
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on firm value as Navisi and Naiker (2006) observed 
was different. They found that firm value decreases 
as a result of increasing in the level of institutional 
investing to a certain level, at the higher levels this 
relationship exhibited a reverse impact. Getting back 
to the study core focus in the protection of investors 
by CG rules, Chiu and Monin (2003) advocateed that 
CG guidelines should be considered on the basis of 
case-by-case rather than one fit all. Considering CG 
compliance in the condition of “comply or explain” 
regime and ownership concentration environment 
research results of Bhuiyan, Roudaki and Clark 
(2013a) reveal that CG compliance enhance 
managerial accountability while mitigate 
management financial discretion decision making. In 
the same way CG compliance promote firm value 
due to enhanced internal control and consequently 
surrounded managerial opportunistic behaviour 
(Bhuiyan, Roudaki and Clark, 2010).  
Using a sample of New Zealand companies in 
the period of 2004-2008, Koerniadi and Tourani Rad 
(2012b) study CG mechanisms from the financing 
policies stand point. Based on an administered CG 
index they found that companies with strong CG 
mechanisms have less leverage than firms with weak 
CG mechanisms. They reported that companies 
implemented different levels of CG mechanisms to 
obtain CG quality. In Another paper Koerniadi and 
Tourani Rad (2012a) examine the impact of 
independent director/s’ presence on firm value. The 
results indicate that when the independent directors 
are in majority they are able to influence firm value 
otherwise their presence negatively influence the 
firm value. Considering the stewardship theory 
results obtained by Koerniadi and Tourani Rad 
(2012a) is justifiable while minority independent 
director is not a successful experienced in the New 
Zealand socio-economic environment.  
The relationship of institutional investors and 
role of executive committee has been investigated in 
the study of Gunasekarage and Wilkinson (2002) 
which the results indicate that as predicted CEO 
compensation exhibited a statistically influence by 
firm performance. Jiang, Habib and Smallman (2009) 
extent this literature to report a nonlinear 
relationship between ownership concentration and 
top managerial compensation.  
Continuing with the discussion of control in 
the New Zealand companies, Murray (2001) said that 
controlling power is compromise when one member 
of directors’ board is the member of other company 
or companies’ board that information may flow into 
a wider business environment. Empirical research of 
Bhuiyan and Roudaki (2013) questioned the 
effectiveness of CG in the light directorship 
interlocking in the New Zealand business context. 
They show that company to company interlock 
(company has interlocking, through the board 
member with other companies) and board interlock 
(directors of one company sit in other boards) has 
an adverse effect on firm performance. Nonetheless, 
interlock directorship has no effect on CG and 
negative impact on ownership concentration 
(Bhuiyan & Roudaki, 2013). 
Board composition including board size, 
presence of independent directors, CEO duality, and 
board diversity are centre of interest of many 
scholars in CG related research studies. While NZSX 
required minimum 3 directors on board, a typical 
board size in New Zealand that is reported to be 7.5 
by 1985 (Fox et al., 2013) decreased to 6.23 in 2010 
as reported by Bhuiyan, Roudaki and Clark (2013b). 
More number of directors can be translated more 
diverse expertise blended in the boards for decision 
making (Hillman, 2000) while increasing possibility 
interlock in the managerial labour market that 
suffers from lack of independent expert directors 
(Bhuiyan & Roudaki, 2013). CEO duality that was 
about 11.4% in 1984 (Fox et al., 2010) has fallen to 
less than one percent in 2010 (Bhuiyan, et al., 
2013a). However, different and controversial 
findings about CEO duality is reported in the 
literature.  
Gender diversity, experience, and expertise of 
the board are other characteristics that formed core 
of some papers. Presence of woman on the board of 
directors of companies (i.e. diversity on board) has 
been increased from 4.1% in 1997 to 5.7 in 2001 
(Van der Walt, Ingley & Townsend, 2006) and then 
increased to 7.7% in 2009 (Fox et al., 2013). Re-
appointment of directors is encouraged by the New 
Zealand CG rules, but there is not a suggested 
threshold for number of time of re-appointment and 
tenure, in this regards, Bhuiyan (2010) reported that 
31 years of combined tenure is common in the 
sample of listed companies during 2000 to 2007.  
Board committees (i.e. audit, remuneration, and 
nomination) are strength of means for board of 
directors to maintain control over the companies’ 
activities and development in the New Zealand 
companies. In the recent years number of companies 
that formed audit committee has increased 
dramatically as in 1982 about 15% of companies 
have active audit committees (Bradbury, 1990) that 
this figure has increased to 22% in 1989 (Lukkassen, 
1998). In the beginning of 1990’s the percentage of 
companies with audit committee increased to 63% 
(Porter & Gendall, 1998) that increased to around 
73% in 2007 (Bhuiyan, 2010). The size of audit 
committee that reported to be on average 3.5 
(included 2.9 non-executive directors) in 1996 (Fox & 
Walker, 1998) has increased to average of 4 
members in 2007 (Bhuiyan, 2010). It is considered 
that audit committee qualification, frequency of 
meeting and composition are a good indicator of a 
decent CG practice. Vineeta, Naiker, and Lee (2009) 
prove that as the managerial ownership increasing 
the frequency of audit committee is increasing. They 
reported that 78% of audit committees in New 
Zealand have an independent director as 
chairperson and 67% include at least one 
professional accountant attending the audit 
committee.  
According to New Zealand CG rules 
establishment of a remuneration committee is 
recommended and the member of such committee 
should be introduced in the annual reports 
(Securities Commission, 2004, 2011). Fox and Walker 
(1996) reported that remuneration committees have 
an average of 3.6 members, while three were non-
executive directors attending the remuneration 
committee of the listed companies.  
The composition of nomination committee is 
explained in the listing rules that required 
Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition / Volume 13, Issue 1, 2017 
 
9 
companies to establish rigours formal and 
transparent charter for nomination and appointment 
of new directors (NZX Listing Rules, 2013). Ingely 
and Walt (2001) found five factors contribute in the 
selection of directors, these factors are related to 
shareholder interests’ representation, industry and 
business community reputation, and recognised 
strategic competences.  
  
1.3. Research Question 
 
Based on the above literature review following 
research questions are developed for the research 
project. 
1) What is the status of corporate governance 
in the New Zealand agricultural companies? 
The above question investigate implementation of 
CG rules in the agricultural companies including 
horticulture and fishery companies. In the compile 
or explain of CG rules in New Zealand socio-
economic environment only those companies that 
are listed are required to implement CG rules and 
include CG disclosure in their annual reports as non-
financial information. As some big non-listed 
companies are preparing such disclosure on the 
voluntary basis it would be possible for this research 
project to include these companies in the study.  
The second question of the research project is: 
2) What is the quality of CG disclosure 
provided by Agricultural companies?  
The same as above all listed and a group of big non-
listed agricultural companies financial and CG 
reports are considered for the qualitative research in 
this study to provide a respond to the above 
question. A Corporate Governance Index is 
developed to examine the quality of CG disclosure 
provided by agricultural companies. Explanation of 
development of the CG Index is included in the 
methodology section of the paper.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
This research uses qualitative research methodology 
to examine the quality of corporate governance 
disclosure included in the published material by 
agricultural companies in the New Zealand socio-
economic environment. The quantitative information 
about CG implementation is collected and analysed 
to expand the qualitative CG discussion. The 
following sections explain population of the study 
and development of CG Index to investigate the 
quality disclosures presented by a sample listed and 
non-listed companies.  
 
2.1. Population of the Study 
 
Agricultural companies including all listed in NZX 
and those big non-listed but providing disclosure 
about implementation of CG is considered as 
population of the study. NZX Listed companies 
including agricultural companies are required to 
adapt NZ Corporate Governance Principles 
Guidelines published by Securities Commission in 
2004 and NZX Listed Rules provided in the website 
of NZX. Some of non-listed agricultural companies 
selected to report CG disclosures as part of their 
annual reports while others prefer to publish such 
disclosures in their website, as a separate section of 
their financial reports, or as an independent report 
next to it. The non-listed companies are selected as a 
comparison base between CG compile or explain 
regime and voluntary environment. It is anticipates 
that listed companies provide more quality and 
quantity of CG disclosure than their non-listed 
counterparts; however as expected not all non-listed 
companies have published a complete or partial CG 
disclosure. To satisfy the objectives of the study all 
11 agricultural listed companies and a group of 10 
not-listed companies that provide CG disclosure are 
selected, few of these companies are government 
owned or affiliated to government agencies or 
departments. However there are many agricultural 
companies that are excluded from the sample of this 
research due to the lack of financial information. 
These companies are not providing any report 
related to CG presented to the public therefore not 
fall into the study sample companies.  
 
2.2. CG Compliance Index 
 
To examine the quality and quantity of CG 
disclosure published by New Zealand agricultural 
companies, a CG Index is developed and 
administered. The Index is developed based on 2004 
New Zealand Corporate Governance Principles and 
Guidelines. The other source of CG compliance index 
development was a comprehensive literature review 
of those scholarly papers that develop and use CG 
check list or index such as Sapovadia (2011), 
Varshney, Kaul  and Vasal,  (2012), Juniarti, and The 
(2012), Grimminger, and Benedetta (2013) and 
Thanh Tu,  Khanh and Quyen (2014). 
Content analysis is implemented in this 
research project for examination of the quality of CG 
disclosure by sample companies. As recommended 
in the literature, in the content analysis a coding 
system and unite/s of analysis should be adopted 
for examination of each item of the index. Extant 
literature has adopted different coding system from 
a binary to five or more levels to reveal the quality 
of each item of the index individually and 
collectively. The analyses embrace from using a 
single word, symbol, phrase, or clause to a complete 
sentence or paragraph.  Based on the needs of the 
study and or availability of the data researchers 
preference in some cases have extended to consider 
a page, themes or even the whole text as unit of 
examination and analysis (Petty & Guthrie, 2000; 
Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006; Vandemaele, 
Vergauwen, & Smits, 2005; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; 
Coy & Dixon, 2004). 
Unite of analysis in this research is considered 
as an informative paragraph, phrase or sentence. 
This method considered as an effective approach to 
reveal the quality of CG disclosure. As the first step 
a descriptive statistical data analysis implemented to 
analyse data obtained from reviewing the quantity 
(i.e. number of pages) of CG disclosure provided by 
agricultural companies. In the content analysis 
phase of the study individual company score is 
calculated as proxy for the quality of each item of 
CG compliance index. This indexed which is 
developed based on New Zealand Corporate 
Governance Principles and Guidelines (2004) 
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includes nine sections, 46 criteria, and 64 best 
practice codes as explained in Table 1. Each best 
practice code is scored two if completed information 
is provided, and considered as score one for partial 
information, otherwise zero. For data analysis two 
horizontal and vertical scores are calculated in a 
matrix of data collected. As the companies are in the 
first column of the matrix each row provides 
Company CG Compliance Disclosure Score (CDS) 
that indicates the quality of disclosure compliance 
with CG Best Practice Codes within all sections, 
criteria, and best practice codes. In the same way as 
CG sections, criteria, and best practice codes are in 
the first two top rows of the matrix therefore each 
column calculates the best practice codes score. In 
analysis the best practice codes scores within each 
criterion is added together to reach the Section CG 
Compliance Score (SCS). This score shows the 
coverage that each section and criterion has received 
from the company’s managerial team to disclose 
about CG guidelines.  
Table 1 presents the number of best practice 
codes included in the developed CG compliance 
index. Based on this table the maximum score for 
each of nine sections of CG guideline would be the 
last column of Table 1 (best practice code) 
multiplied by two. Following this calculation, the 
maximum total Company CG Compliance Disclosure 
Score is 128 (64X2). The last column of table one 
presenting the maximum compliance scores for each 
section of the CG. 
 
Table 1. Number of Criteria and Best Practice Codes in Each Section of the CG Compliance Index 
 
 
Section Criterion Best Practice Code Max. SCS 
1 Ethical Standards 5 11 22 
2 Board Composition and Performance 11 14 28 
3 Board and Audit Committees 5 9 18 
4 Reporting and Disclosure 7 7 14 
5 Remuneration 5 5 10 
6 Risk Management 3 3 6 
7 Auditors 6 7 14 
8 Shareholder Relations 4 7 14 
9 Shareholder Interest* 1 1 2 
 
Total 47 64 128 
*Shareholder Interest section has three best practice codes in the original index, since two of the codes were 
extremely subjective, data collection was impossible therefore omitted form data analysis.  
  
As recommended in the literature (for example 
Garcia-Meca & Martinez, 2005) in the context of 
asymmetric information, the CG disclosures are 
considered to be a highly asymmetric information, 
the costs (including financial, non-financial, and 
social cost) of providing such information in some 
cases surpassed the benefits (including financial, 
non-financial, and social) drives from disclosure of 
such information. However, considering legitimacy 
and signalling theories justifying the unfavourable 
outcomes. This research considers this 
environmental factor into consideration to reveal the 
quality of CG disclosures provided.  
 
3. RESULT DISCUSSION 
 
The results are presented into two sections of 
quantitative that explain the number of pages and 
quality of CG disclosure.  
 
3.1. Quantitative Results 
 
Table 2 shows number of pages that each of the 21 
companies provided as part of their CG disclosure. 
As all agricultural companies have been considered 
as population of this study, there were five 
agricultural companies that they did not prepare any 
information related to CG as separate or part of 
financial information. This table provide general 
information about the status of CG implication by 
New Zealand agricultural companies that provide 
partially answer to the first question of this 
research.  
As it is appear from Table 2, CG disclosure 
presented as a part of financial report is the most 
common approach in the agricultural companies. 
The quantity (i.e. number of pages) of presented 
information is varied from 12 pages to one page 
while the average pages of this type of reporting is 
5.7 and 4.2 for listed and non-listed companies 
respectively. Preparation of a separate CG report is 
less common in the listed companies and only two 
out of 10 non-listed companies that provide CG 
disclosure prepare such separate report; the number 
of pages are very different. Other component of 
good practice in corporate governance that have 
recommended by CG guidelines received less 
attention from listed companies. Disclosures related 
to board of directors code of ethics and board of 
director charter are prepared by eight listed and 
three non-listed companies. When it comes to 
remuneration and nomination board committees the 
number of companies and the number pages drop 
dramatically to few pages of disclosures and only 
four listed companies and one not listed companies 
prepared separate information about their 
remuneration committee information while one and 
none listed and not listed companies prepared 
information related to remuneration. Audit and risk 
management committee is in the same boat that 
only three listed and one not listed company 
provided some information about this section of CG.  
The empty boxes in Table 2 are due to the fact that 
the study was not able to find published related 
information.  
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Table 2. Quantitative Information about CG Disclosure by Agricultural Companies 
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L1 NZX 11 4 1.5 2 2 2.5  
L2 NZX 12 1 11     
L3 NZX 3.5 3.5 3 2  4.5  
L4 NZX 2       
L5 NZX 1       
L6 NZX 3 1 7 6  8  
L7 NZX 8 10 6 3 9   
L8 NZX 5 9      
L9 NZX 5.5  1     
L10 NZX 3.5 0.5 1     
L11 NZX 8 2.5 Few pages     
 Average 5.7       
N1 Not Listed 13  2     
N2 Not Listed 3  4.5     
N3 Not Listed 3       
N4 Not Listed 5 9 7 2  3  
N5 Not listed 3       
N6 Not listed 2       
N7 Not listed 1.5       
N8 Not Listed 4       
N9 Not Listed 3 2      
N10 Not Listed 0 2.5 0.5     
 Average 4.2       
 
Consider the level of published GC disclosure 
material included in Table 2, it is interesting to look 
at the external auditors of these companies. As 
included in Table 3, all of these companies are 
audited by Big 4 auditors while two of auditors are 
more actives than others. PWC and KPMG audited 
five and three of listed companies and one and 
seven not listed companies respectively.  
 
Table 3.  External Auditors, Number of Companies 
 
 Listed Not Listed 
PWC 5 1 
KPMG 3 7 
Deloitte 2 1 
Ernst & Young 1 1 
 
3.2. Quality of CG Disclosure 
 
In the qualitative data analysis phase of the study, 
implementing the CG Compliance Score two vertical 
and horizontal scores are calculated. The horizontal 
score, the Company CG Compliance Disclosure Score 
(CDS) for each listed (ALC) and none listed (ANC) 
company is calculated. The vertical score of Section 
CG Compliance Score (SCS) for each ALC and ANC is 
calculated. The CDS reveals the level of compliance 
or extended of adaptation of the CG guidelines that 
recommended by NZX in the “compile or explain” 
environment by the sample individual agricultural 
companies. The SCS indicates the usage of each the 
nine sections of the CG Compliance Score from 
holistic view point.  In the other words this score 
shows the popularity of the each section, criteria 
and best practice of the CG guidelines in 
comparison. In order to compare the companies 
CDSs the percentage of the scores on the basis of 
maximum score of each criterion or best practice 
code is calculated. To observed anonymously of 
companies eleven agricultural listed companies are 
numbered as L1 to L11 and in the same way 10 non-
listed companies named as N1 to N10 in the data 
analysis and result presentations.  
As explained in the CG Compliance Index 
section, the maximum score for each company is 
128, table 4 shows each company CG compliance 
disclosure score (CDS) by the ALC and ANC. This 
table also presents the CDS for each company 
considering nine sections of the CG guidelines. Due 
to the fact that CG codes are required for ALC while 
volunteer for ANC therefore CDS of listed and not 
listed are presented separately while arranged from 
the highest CDS in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Company CG Compliance Disclosure Scores (CDS) 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS Percentage Company CDS Percentage 
L7 101 76.5% N4 87 65.9% 
L3 80 60.6% N8 40 30.3% 
L6 77 58.3% N2 35 26.5% 
L8 68 51.5% N7 29 22.0% 
L1 62 47.0% N1 21 15.9% 
L9 50 37.9% N6 20 15.2% 
L10 49 37.1% N9 17 12.9% 
L11 27 20.5% N10 15 11.4% 
L2 27 20.5% N5 13 9.8% 
L4 26 19.7% N3 8 6.1% 
L5 22 16.7%   
 
Average 53.55 40.6% Average 28.5 21.6% 
STD 26.41728085 
 
STD 22.8533975 
 
Skew 0.345165488 
 
Skew 2.14853942 
 
 
While the average of CG Compliance Disclosure 
Scores (CDS) in the ALCs column of Table 4 is much 
higher than ANCs (40.6% and 21.6% respectively), 
both scores are much lower than the maximum 
scores of compliance which is 128 (see Table 1). The 
highest percentage of required CG compliance by the 
ALCs indicates that at the best 76.5% of required 
disclosures are publicly available. Interestingly the 
highest percentage of CG compliance of ANCs which 
are not required to present such disclosures is 
65.9%, with the average of 21.6%. In addition the 
skewness of CDSs for ALCs is close to 0.5 indicating 
that the scores are distributed approximately 
symmetric, while the skewness of the same scores 
for ANCs is more than two saying that scores are 
skewed towards to the lowest. Results presented in 
Table 4 indicate that while ALCs did not fulfil the 
requirements of CG disclosures, they are almost 
homogenous in providing of such disclosures. 
Table 5 presents the total of SCSs and 
corresponding percentage for each of the 9 CG 
compliance sections scores. Again listed and not 
listed are reported separately due to the nature of 
required compliance and volunteer disclosure. This 
table present an all-inclusive picture of status of CG 
compliance in the New Zealand agricultural 
companies.  
As it is appear from Table 5 all SCSs are not 
high, on average only 37.6% of possible disclosure is 
provided by ALCs while ANCs the average is 19.5% 
to build the overall average of 29%. Disclosure about 
Board and Audit Committee section of CG has the 
maximum percentage that are 61.1% and 49.7% by 
two groups of the companies, while this section is 
the only section that obtain a little above fifty 
percentage of required disclosure by ALCs. While the 
trend of disclosure follows the same pattern in both 
group of companies, two sections of CG have stood 
above others have the percentage of a little less than 
50% in the ALCs. These sections are Composition 
and Performance and Remuneration sections. The 
level of disclosure about Shareholder Interests is low 
due to the fact that the best practice codes that are 
suggested by CG codes of best practice are very 
subjective while companies was not good at 
presenting evidence about shareholders interest. 
Apart from this section, disclosure about Auditors 
section of the compliance Score is low (27.3% by 
ALCs and 21.1% by ANCs) indicating that while 
companies are providing marginal information about 
their audit committees, they are not following the 
same manner in providing information about 
auditors of the company. 
 
Table 5. Section CG Compliance Scores for Agricultural Listed and not-Listed Companies 
 
Section Listed Companies Not-Listed Companies All Companies 
 SCS Percentage SCS Percentage SCS Percentage 
Ethical Standards 91 37.6% 21 9.5% 112 24.2% 
Board Composition and Performance 141 45.8% 83 29.6% 224 38.10% 
Board and Audit Committees 121 61.1% 67 37.2% 188 49.7% 
Reporting and Disclosure 60 39.0% 35 25.0% 95 32.3% 
Remuneration 51 46.4% 29 29.0% 80 38.1% 
Risk Management 26 39.4% 4 6.7% 30 23.8% 
Auditors 42 27.3% 20 14.3% 62 21.1% 
Shareholder Relations 51 33.1% 20 14.3% 71 24.1% 
Shareholder Interests 6 9.1% 6 10.0% 12 9.5% 
Average 
 
37.6% 
 
19.5% 
 
29.0% 
Skew 
 
-0.56334 
 
0.418231 
 
0.212212041 
 
3.3. Ethical Standards 
 
The first section of CG guideline is ethics that 
includes 11 best practice codes which the scores are 
presented in Table 6 for both groups of the 
companies. Based on research scoring system of the 
quality of disclosure, 22 is the maximum of the 
compliance score for this section. Further enquiry to 
the level of disclosure indicates that four ALCs and 
seven ANCs are not providing any disclosure about 
ethics in the period of the study. Ironically ALCs are 
required by NZX listing rules to disclose CG 
compliance while they are all audited by Big 4 
auditors (see Table 3). As the companies are sorted 
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by the heights level of disclosure, the maximum of 
90.9% is a good score for L7 (company number 7) 
that is followed by two other counterparts with 
levels of disclosure of 86.4% and 81.8%. The level of 
disclosure is dropped dramatically from company 
four in the ALCs column. In the ANCs group apart 
from the first one which provides a good level of 
disclosure other either provides very low disclosure 
or nothing at all. Considering that four ALCs and 
seven ANCs are not providing any disclosure about 
ethical standards, average of disclosure scores are 
8.3 and 5.0 for both groups respectively. Moreover 
CDSs skewness of ALCs is between zero and 0.5 that 
indicates the distribution is approximately 
symmetric while there are companies that produce 
high quality of disclosure to companies produce 
nothing at all.  
 
 
Table 6. Ethics Standards CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS Percentage Company CDS Percentage 
L7 20 90.9% N4 16 72.7% 
L3 19 86.4% N2 4 18.2% 
L6 18 81.8% N7 1 4.5% 
L1 12 54.5% N1 0 0.0% 
L8 12 54.5% N3 0 0.0% 
L10 8 36.4% N5 0 0.0% 
L2 2 9.1% N6 0 0.0% 
L4 0 0.0% N8 0 0.0% 
L5 0 0.0% N9 0 0.0% 
L9 0 0.0% N10 0 0.0% 
L11 0 0.0% 
   
Average 8.3 37.6% Average 2.1 0.095455 
STD 8.295672 0.377076 STD 5.043147 0.229234 
Skewness 0.291102 0.291102 Skewness 2.843873 2.843873 
 
From another angle a detail Ethical Standards 
scores in each of the 11 best practices by all 
companies are presented in Figure 1. In this Figure 
companies are sorted by size (log of total assets as 
proxy). As appear in this Figure the mean of CDSs 
that indicate the CG disclosure compliance following 
the same pattern in the ALCs and ANCs while the 
line of related to ANCs except for few companies is 
much lower. As the companies in Figure 1 are sorted 
by size, it seems that larger ALCs are relatively 
provided more disclosure about ethics standards 
than their counterpart from ANCs group. When it 
comes to smaller companies, listed firms relatively 
provides less disclosure about ethics standards than 
smaller not listed firms because the distance of the 
two lines is relatively narrower as moving towards 
smaller companies.  
 
Figure 1. Ethics Standards Section of the CG Compliance Score 
 
 
 
3.4. Board composition and performance 
 
This section of the CG Compliance score consists of 
11 criteria and 14 best practice codes therefore 28 is 
the maximum score. Table 7 presents Board 
Composition and Performance CDS for ALCs and 
ANCs which arranged from the highest scored 
company for two groups separately.  Unlike the 
previous section of the CG guidelines although the 
disclosure scores are lower, but all companies of two 
groups are providing some disclosure. Nevertheless 
as expected the ALCs provide more disclosure than 
ANCs, but the CDS percentage of the highest ALCs 
and ANCs are very close (78.6% and 71.4% 
respectively) while the same percentage for least 
ALC is much lower than ANC counterpart.  
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Table 7. Board Composition CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L7 22 78.6% N4 20 71.4% 
L8 20 71.4% N2 12 42.9% 
L9 19 67.9% N8 10 35.7% 
L1 15 53.6% N10 9 32.1% 
L3 13 46.4% N7 8 28.6% 
L2 12 42.9% N1 7 25.0% 
L6 12 42.9% N6 7 25.0% 
L10 12 42.9% N9 4 14.3% 
L11 9 32.1% N3 3 10.7% 
L4 6 21.4% N5 3 10.7% 
L5 1 3.6% 
   
Average 12.82 45.7% Average 8.3 29.6% 
STD 6.177672 0.220631 STD 5.078276 0.181367 
Skewness -0.32855 -0.32855 Skewness 1.353053 1.353053 
 
The averages of disclosure scores about board 
composition and performance are 12.8 and 8.3 for 
both groups respectively. Skewness of CDS of ALCs 
indicating that scores are approximately symmetric, 
while skewness of ANC scores is highly skewed 
towards the low level of disclosure for board 
composition and performance disclosure. 
Figure 2 shows the scores for each of 14 the 
best practice codes of Board Composition and 
Performance. The levels of disclosure for all SCSs of 
this section of the CG score for both groups of 
companies are very close. While the level of 
disclosure about three best practice codes (i.e. 2.1 - 
An appropriate balance of executive and non-
executive directors, 2.3 - Monitoring that directors 
act in the best interests of the entity, ahead of other 
interests ,and 2.13 - Disclosure that Identifying 
which directors are independent) are high they are 
almost the same for both groups of companies. The 
score of CEO duality disclosure and formal criteria 
for independent directors are satisfactory but not 
enough, the total scores are slightly above 50% by 
ALCs while ANCs are reluctant to provide disclosure 
about these two best practice codes (scores are 
around 20%).  While the companies are arranged 
from big to small, the two line of trend of the level 
of disclosure especially for smaller companies are 
very close while the lines for bigger companies are 
exhibiting a mix match trend when considering two 
lines.  
 
Figure 2. Board Composition and Performance Section of the CG Compliance Score 
 
 
 
 
3.5. Board and Audit Committees 
 
Table 8 shows the scores and percentages of Board 
and Audit Committee Disclosures for all companies. 
Since there are 5 criteria and 9 best practices in this 
section of CG therefore the maximum score is 18. In 
this table companies are arranged by their CDS from 
the highest. Unlike the previous three tables 
company number 7 (L7) which was in the top in 
those tables in this table takes the third position.  
The second and third companies (L3 and L6) move to 
the first position with the same CDSs that are 100% 
disclosure. Interestingly, one company from two 
groups is providing no disclosure about Board and 
Audit Committee codes of best practice. However, 
score of ALCs are higher than ANCs.  There is a 
credibility gap between the highest score (100%) and 
the lowest score which is zero in the ALC column. 
The skewness is approximately symmetric indicate a 
unique condition for the average of disclosure (i.e. 
11) about Board and Audit Committee of CG 
compliance Score.  The average of ANC scores is as 
low as 6.7 out of maximum score of 18 while 
distribution is skewed towards the maximum 
indication that few companies provide good quality 
of disclosure on oppose to those are lagging behind.  
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Table 8. Board and Audit Committee Disclosure CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L3 18 100.0% N4 13 72.2% 
L6 18 100.0% N8 13 72.2% 
L7 16 88.9% N7 10 55.6% 
L9 15 83.3% N1 8 44.4% 
L4 12 66.7% N6 7 38.9% 
L1 10 55.6% N2 6 33.3% 
L8 10 55.6% N5 6 33.3% 
L10 10 55.6% N9 3 16.7% 
L5 8 44.4% N3 1 5.6% 
L11 4 22.2% N10 0 0.0% 
L2 0 0.0% 
   
Average 11 61.1% Average 6.7 37.2% 
STD 5.674504 0.31525 STD 4.522782 0.251266 
Skewness -0.55386 -0.55386 Skewness 0.001441 0.001441 
 
Considering Figure 3 that includes SCSs for 
Board and Audit Committee Section of the research 
CG Compliance Score. Most of the best practice 
codes of this section are received high attention by 
ALCs. However, ANCs as in the previous CG section 
follow the same pattern but in the lower level of 
disclosure. In comparison to other best practice 
codes disclosure about two of them (manly: 3.4 -
audit committee recommend the appointment of 
external auditors and 3.6 - audit committee promote 
integrity in financial reporting) are very low in both 
groups, it could be related to the nature of these 
codes that are too subjective therefore companies 
were not able to present documentation about 
implementing of this section best practice codes.  
These two codes are classified as audit committee 
duty which is one of the five criteria of Board and 
Audit Committees section. As the two groups of 
companies are sorted by size (Log of total assets as 
proxy) therefore fluctuation of two lines in Figure 3 
could be considered as an indicator of that company 
size may explain the level of disclosure in this 
section of CG.  
 
Figure 3. Board and Audit Committee Section of the CG Compliance Score 
 
 
 
3.6. Reporting and Disclosure 
 
Low averages of Reporting and Disclosure CDSs that 
are presented in Table 9 indicating that both groups 
of companies are not good at in providing enough 
evidence for this section of CG.  On the other hand 
the best practices indicators of this section having 
some aspects of subjectivity that undermines the 
result of qualitative research that considers 
published disclosure as source of data collection. 
This section of the CG Compliance Scores has seven 
best practices in seven criteria, that the maximum 
score is 14. Data to prove that companies are 
compiled with the best practice of this section of CG 
may collected through focus group brain storming 
of knowledgeables in this area and those people 
involve in using the published financial reports as 
part of their decision making process. CG scores of 
the best practices (i.e. SCS) of this section flow the 
same trend of disclosure therefore presentation the 
related figure is not adding much to the discussion 
of the results.   
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Table 9. Reporting and Disclosure CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L3 11 78.6% N4 12 85.7% 
L6 11 78.6% N2 7 50.0% 
L7 11 78.6% N6 3 21.4% 
L8 7 50.0% N7 3 21.4% 
L5 6 42.9% N8 3 21.4% 
L10 5 35.7% N10 3 21.4% 
L1 4 28.6% N1 2 14.3% 
L9 3 21.4% N5 1 7.1% 
L4 1 7.1% N9 1 7.1% 
L11 1 7.1% N3 0 0.0% 
L2 0 0.0% 
   
Average 5.45 38.9% Average 3.5 25% 
STD 4.156047 0.296861 STD 3.535534 0.252538 
Skewness 0.26974 0.26974 Skewness 1.819621 1.819621 
 
3.7. Remuneration 
 
As Table 10 shows the averages disclosure scores 
about Remuneration provided by of two groups of 
companies are below 50%. This supporting the idea 
that listed companies are not fully compile with 
financial market requirement of adoption of CG 
regulations. Voluntary environment of CG adoption 
in the non-listed companies is not suggesting any 
quality disclosure about management remuneration 
as well.  Analysis of the five best practices of this 
section is following the same pattern. While the 
trend of disclosure scores of ALCs is above but near 
the ANCs scores trends, both trends are very low.  
 
Table 10. Remuneration CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L11 8 80.0% N4 10 100.0% 
L2 6 60.0% N8 6 60.0% 
L3 6 60.0% N2 4 40.0% 
L7 6 60.0% N5 3 30.0% 
L10 6 60.0% N9 3 30.0% 
L1 5 50.0% N1 1 10.0% 
L6 5 50.0% N6 1 10.0% 
L8 5 50.0% N7 1 10.0% 
L4 3 30.0% N3 0 0.0% 
L5 1 10.0% N10 0 0.0% 
L9 0 0.0% 
   
Average 4.64 46.4% Average 2.9 29.0% 
STD 2.377929 0.237793 STD 3.142893 0.314289 
Skewness -0.94338 -0.94338 Skewness 1.430191 1.430191 
 
As presented in Figure 5, the disclosure scores 
of setting policy for remuneration of executive and 
disclosing remuneration policy in the annual reports 
are higher than other best practice codes in this 
section of the CG compliance Score. Disclosure 
about non-executive director receive a retirement 
payment has the least score indicating that 
companies are reluctant to disclose much about 
personal aspects of their non-executive directors. 
Ironically while two lines of SCS are very close for 
almost half of the codes of best practice, these lines 
meet each other at the end indicating there is no 
different between two groups of companies.   
 
Figure 5. Remuneration Section of the CG Compliance Score 
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3.8. Risk Management 
 
Risk Management includes three best practices in 
three criteria recommended by CG Compliance Score 
therefore the maximum score is 6. As Table 11 
shows only two ALCs are providing quality 
disclosure about this section (CDS percentages are 
100% and 83.3%0) other companies in this group 
disclosure scores are below 50% that make the 
average of score as low as 2.4 out of maximum of 
six. Except two ANCs that provide some disclosure 
others did not bother themselves to provide any 
sensible disclosure about risk management in their 
companies.  
From another angle looking at the individual 
CG score of the three best practice of risk 
management.  Although the first best practice of this 
section of CG Compliance Score (Rigorous processes 
for risk management and internal control) is 
received some attention to be considered to prepare 
disclosure about it but the other two best practice 
codes (i.e. Risk management Report and 
accountability) of this section stimulate very low 
level of attention for providing disclosures.   
 
Table 11.  Risk Management CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L7 6 100.0% N4 3 50.0% 
L8 5 83.3% N9 1 16.7% 
L1 3 50.0% N1 0 0.0% 
L6 3 50.0% N2 0 0.0% 
L3 2 33.3% N3 0 0.0% 
L5 2 33.3% N5 0 0.0% 
L10 2 33.3% N6 0 0.0% 
L2 1 16.7% N7 0 0.0% 
L9 1 16.7% N8 0 0.0% 
L11 1 16.7% N10 0 0.0% 
L4 0 0.0% 
   
Average 2.36 39.3% Average 0.4 6.7% 
STD 1.804036 0.300673 STD 0.966092 0.161015 
Skewness 0.956886 0.956886 Skewness 2.661681 2.661681 
 
3.9. Auditors 
 
Only one company (L7 CDS, 92.9%) in Table 12 
exceptionally has the highest, except this company 
others are not interested to provide sensitive 
disclosure about their auditors, or in the very 
optimistic view point they consider it as given. 
Nevertheless The Auditors section of CG has six 
criteria and seven best practices with the maximum 
score of 14. CDS of ANCs in this area is too low, 
except the first three companies that provide some 
disclosure about their auditors; others provide 
either nothing or very low disclosures in this 
section. Notably auditors play an important in 
promoting to restore a sound internal control. The 
scores presented in Table 8 indicating mixed results 
about disclosure about Audit Committee. Putting 
together these results one can conclude that sample 
companies are not good in restoring internal control 
systems.  
 
Table 12. Auditors CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L7 13 92.9% N8 6 42.9% 
L1 7 50.0% N4 5 35.7% 
L3 5 35.7% N9 4 28.6% 
L6 5 35.7% N3 2 14.3% 
L9 5 35.7% N7 2 14.3% 
L8 4 28.6% N6 1 7.1% 
L10 3 21.4% N1 0 0.0% 
L2 0 0.0% N2 0 0.0% 
L4 0 0.0% N5 0 0.0% 
L5 0 0.0% N10 0 0.0% 
L11 0 0.0% 
   
Average 3.82 27.2% Average 2 14.3% 
STD 3.970345 0.283596 STD 2.260777 0.161484 
Skewness 1.148364 1.148364 Skewness 0.793302 0.793302 
 
Considering company scores as explained 
above, one can expect that individual best practices 
scores (i.e. vertical analysis) for each best practice 
codes of Auditor section should not be high.  Among 
six criteria and seven best practice codes of this 
section of the CG guidelines only the code related to 
evidence that shows external auditor and the entity 
are independent gain rather high score when it 
comes to consider individual codes scores.  Other 
codes of best practice of this section are not 
receiving properly disclosures. Ironically the code 
about 1) report annually to shareholders and 
stakeholders about Audit Fees and 2) differentiate 
between fees for audit and fees for individually 
identified non-audit work are among the lowest 
scores indicating less transparency in the area of 
what companies are paid to auditor’s professional 
and related exertions.  
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3.10. Shareholder Relations 
 
Shareholders relations section of CG has four 
criteria and seven best practices recommended by 
the CG guidelines, score 14 is the highest possible 
score. Table 13 presents Shareholder relation CDSs 
for the listed and non-listed sample companies. As 
appear from this table all scores are low. The highest 
percentage of scores for this section is 50% while 
others scores indicating low disclosures and 
consequently insufficient transparency. The average 
of 4.6 and 2 out of maximum of 14 for ALC and ANL 
respectively are another indication that this section 
of CG Compliance Score is not popular among 
agricultural companies. However sample companies 
are either listed or big agricultural companies that 
cannot be considered as fully family owned business 
to conclude that due to family ownerships 
transparency reporting is neglected.     
 
Table 13. Shareholder Relations CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L9 7 50.0% N4 5 35.7% 
L1 6 42.9% N7 3 21.4% 
L2 6 42.9% N10 3 21.4% 
L3 5 35.7% N2 2 14.3% 
L7 5 35.7% N3 2 14.3% 
L8 5 35.7% N8 2 14.3% 
L4 4 28.6% N1 1 7.1% 
L5 4 28.6% N6 1 7.1% 
L6 4 28.6% N9 1 7.1% 
L11 4 28.6% N5 0 0.0% 
L10 1 7.1% 
   
Average 4.64 33.1% Average 2 14.3% 
STD 1.566699 0.111907 STD 1.414214 0.101015 
Skewness -0.97555 -0.97555 Skewness 0.883883 0.883883 
 
From individual seven best practice codes 
(vertical analysis) of shareholder relations the first 
code (Have clear published policies for shareholder 
relations and regularly review practices) is drawing 
some attention from companies managers, other 
codes either exhibit low attention or none therefore 
there is no point for graphical presentation.    
 
3.11. Stakeholder Interests 
 
Disclosure abort Shareholders Interest as included in 
Table 14 has the lowest CDSs. Only four ALCs and 
three ANCs provide low quality of disclosures while 
other does not bother to do so. Interestingly the 
highest score and CDS average of ANCs while low 
are higher than the ALC scores that assumed to 
provide compulsory disclosures as listing 
requirement.  From individual best practice codes 
(vertical analysis) all codes have very low scores that 
graphical presentation is not providing values to 
result presentation.  
 
Table 14. Shareholder Interest CDS 
 
Agricultural Listed Companies Agricultural Not-Listed Companies 
Company CDS CDS % Company CDS CDS % 
L7 2 33.3% N4 3 50.0% 
L10 2 33.3% N1 2 33.3% 
L3 1 16.7% N7 1 16.7% 
L6 1 16.7% N2 0 0.0% 
L1 0 0.0% N3 0 0.0% 
L2 0 0.0% N5 0 0.0% 
L4 0 0.0% N6 0 0.0% 
L5 0 0.0% N8 0 0.0% 
L8 0 0.0% N9 0 0.0% 
L9 0 0.0% N10 0 0.0% 
L11 0 0.0% 
   
Average 0.54 9.1% Average 0.6 10.0% 
STD 0.8202 0.1367 STD 1.074968 0.179161 
Skewness 1.153312 1.153312 Skewness 1.69057 1.69057 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS 
 
This paper investigates the status and 
implementation of New Zealand CG 2004 guidelines 
in the listed (ALC) and non-listed (ANC) agricultural 
companies. The content analysis of the survey 
considers all nine sections of the CG guidelines that 
include 47 criteria and 64 best practices. The results 
indicating low compile with these guidelines in both 
groups of listed and non-listed companies. However, 
as expected ALCs implement CG guidelines much 
more extensively than ANCs. All companies 
considered to include if not much but few CG 
disclosures in their published financial reports, 
however the general trend demonstrating a low level 
of disclosure.  As required by listing rules a majority 
of ALCs provided a separate CG report while ANCs 
were not active in this voluntary task. Considering 
that all companies were audited by Big 4 Auditors, 
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one can assume that all ALCs observed listing 
requirement of complying with CG guidelines but 
neglected publishing complying reports. 
Nevertheless auditors’ report is silent about this 
uncompliant.  
Two scores were calculated to rank the 
companies’ level of complying with CG criteria and 
best practices.  The first score was Company CG 
Compliance Disclosure Score (CDS) witch exposes 
the level of each company compiling with CG rules. 
The next score was Section CG Compliance Score 
(SCS) which reveals the level of implementation of 
each section and best practice of CG guidelines by 
Agricultural companies. Ranking companies by their 
CDS indicating that although all the scores are low 
but a group of three big ALCs stay on the top for the 
level of quality disclosures about almost all nine 
sections and 47 criterion of CG guidelines. They are 
chased by a group of two ANCs. Interestingly a 
group of ALCs select not to comply with CG rules; 
their percentages of compliant even are less than 
voluntary disclosures provided by ANCs.   
Contrasting and comparing the Section CG 
Compliance Scores indicating that the highest 
percentage of disclosure provided by the ALCs is 
about Board and Audit Committees, while the ANCs 
highest percentage of disclosure is about Board 
Composition and Performance. Disclosure about 
Shareholder Interests has the lowest percentage by 
both groups of agricultural companies.  
It may be in the interest of legislators and NZX 
authorities that agricultural companies are paying 
less attention to implementation of CG guidelines 
that increase their risk management consequently 
fading their domestic and international 
competitiveness positions. Considering the 
importance of agricultural product in the exporting 
and GNP of the country mitigating such risk is an 
important task. The results of this paper contribute 
in curving risk management imposing by 
uncompliant with CG guidelines.  
Like other content analysis studies this survey 
suffers from some limitations such as lack of 
verifiable published material, long list of variables 
(i.e. items of CG index) to be examined by checking 
the available texts. Preparing and implementing a 
complete list of required CG disclosures remain a 
challenge in this survey.  
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